Brighton & Hove Albion Financial Results 2024/25
- Matchday Finance
- 2 days ago
- 11 min read
The 2024/25 campaign marked the 123rd season in Brighton’s history and their eighth consecutive year in the Premier League. They were the third club to publish their results for 2024/25, following the two Manchester clubs.
On the pitch, the 2024/25 season represented another positive step for the club. Under new manager Fabian Hürzeler, Brighton achieved their third top-ten finish in the last four seasons—an outstanding achievement for a club that, in 2009, when Tony Bloom purchased it, was competing in League One and without a permanent home.
Bloom’s ownership model is widely regarded as one that many aspiring clubs seek to follow. However, this success followed several years of significant investment. Bloom has invested around £500 million in the club, initially in their facilities and subsequently in the playing squad. In recent seasons, Brighton have enjoyed success both on and off the pitch, with top-ten finishes (and European qualification) matched by some of the highest profits in the league, driven by a highly effective player-trading strategy.
This approach shifted in the 2024/25 season. The club invested heavily in new players, generated lower profits from player sales, and consequently reported a loss for the first time in three seasons. This also required further cash injections from Bloom, offsetting the repayments he had received in the previous two seasons.
Despite this loss, the club remains in a strong financial position, although—like many—it continues to rely on the support of its owner. Profitable player sales are therefore likely to remain a key part of Brighton’s strategy as it continues to manage costs and comply with the league’s profit and sustainability rules.
Financial Results 2024/25
Financial highlights:
Revenue: Total revenue was £222 million, broadly consistent with the previous season. The absence of European competition reduced revenues, but this was offset by a higher domestic league finish (8th versus 11th) and increased commercial income, which rose to £43 million from £31 million the previous season.
Staff costs: Following significant player acquisitions, salaries and wages increased sharply by £18 million, reaching £164 million for the season. These acquisitions also led to a doubling of player amortisation, rising from £39 million in the previous season to £82 million in 2024/25. Overall staff costs totalled £247 million, likely around the ninth highest in the league and still less than half the cost base of the largest clubs.
Player sales: The sales of Undav, Gilmour, Groß and Moder were the main contributors to £57 million in player sale profits, down from £110 million in the previous season.
Profit/loss: The club reported its first loss in four years, posting a £55 million deficit compared to a £75 million profit in the prior season. This reversal was primarily driven by higher staff costs and reduced profits from player sales. The club also recorded a loss of 9 million from their Monks Farm residential developments. This is treated as an exceptional item in this analysis.
Net assets: Net assets declined to negative £10 million following a £100 million increase in directors loans, used to fund player acquisitions..
Player trading: The club spent £210 million on incoming players—likely the fourth-highest spend in the league—with Rutter, Wieffer, Gruda, Kadioglu, O’Riley, Tzimas, Gomez and Cashin all joining for significant fees. This expenditure was partially offset by £64 million generated from player sales.
Loans and debt: After two years of loan repayments, a further £100 million loan was provided by Bloom, increasing the director’s loan balance to £406 million. The loan is interest-free and repayable on demand. Transfer-related debt also increased, reaching a net £87 million following the scale of player acquisitions.
Cash Flow: The club generated operating cash flows of £15 million and recorded a net investment outflow of £99 million. The resulting cash shortfall was funded through an increase in borrowings of £107 million.
Financial Outlook
With no European competition this season, Brighton’s revenue will depend largely on their league position. They are currently 11th, three spots below last season’s final placing. The new Premier League broadcast cycle, with higher international rights income, will increase revenue for all clubs. Alongside likely growth in commercial income, there is potential for a small overall revenue increase this season.
However, the club’s cost base has risen significantly, so they are expected to record a substantial operating loss before player sales. Player sales completed so far should generate around £50–60 million. Assuming a similar league finish to last season, the club is again likely to report a loss, although it should be slightly smaller than the previous campaign.
Turnover
Revenue comes from three main sources: matchday income (ticket sales), broadcasting distributions (from the Premier League and UEFA if participating in European competitions), and commercial activities such as sponsorships, merchandising, and other business operations.
The 2023/24 season marked a record high for the club, a milestone that was matched in 2024/25 as revenues once again reached €222 million.
With only Brighton and the two Manchester clubs having published their financial results so far, the chart below compares their reported figures with estimated revenues for the remaining clubs. Our analysis suggests that Liverpool generated the highest revenue in the 2024/25 season, while Brighton ranked eleventh.
Matchday Revenue
Matchday revenue is shaped by a range of factors, including the number of home fixtures, average attendance, ticket pricing, and a club’s ability to generate income from hospitality and corporate boxes. The main exception is domestic cup competitions, where revenues are shared between the participating clubs and the FA.
Brighton have played at the Amex Stadium since 2011, with the ground holding 31,876 spectators. During the 2024/25 season, the club averaged 31,482 fans per league match, the eleventh-highest attendance in the Premier League.
The absence of European competition meant Brighton played four fewer high-value home matches, reducing the overall number of paying spectators by around 13%. However, this decline was offset by higher ticket prices, leaving matchday revenue unchanged at £28 million, in line with the 2023/24 season.
Brighton’s matchday revenue places them at the upper end of the Premier League’s small and mid-sized clubs. They benefit from a relatively high revenue per spectator of £41.51, a figure matched only by Newcastle outside the so-called “big six”.
While the table below is based on estimates for clubs that have yet to publish their accounts, Brighton’s matchday revenue is expected to rank tenth across the league.
The club is in the midst of a £40 million redevelopment of the Amex Stadium. Early phases of the project included the opening of the fan zone, The Terrace, which launched in April last year. Future phases will see away supporters relocated and the stadium’s overall capacity increased by around 800 seats.
Broadcast Revenue
Broadcast revenue is generated primarily through central Premier League distributions, UEFA payments from European competition—when applicable, though Brighton did not compete in Europe in 2024/25—and the club’s own media activities.
The 2024/25 season marked the third and final year of the Premier League’s current broadcast cycle, with total distributions broadly in line with those of 2023/24. Around 67% of broadcast income is shared equally among clubs, with the remainder distributed through merit payments based on league position and facility fees linked to the number of live televised matches.
Brighton’s eighth-place finish resulted in an increase in Premier League distributions, rising from £137 million to £145 million.
The chart below shows the club by club distributions as published by the premier league.
Brighton generated £17 million from their participation in the Europa Conference League in 2023/24, but this fell to zero in 2024/25 following their absence from European competition.
The chart below presents total estimated broadcast revenue, incorporating Premier League distributions, UEFA payments and income from the newly expanded FIFA Club World Cup, which was contested only by Chelsea and Manchester City. The comparison highlights the significant financial advantage of competing in these tournaments, with Champions League participation alone capable of generating revenues in excess of £100 million.
Commercial Revenue
Brighton continued to grow their commercial revenue during the 2024/25 season. In Brighton’s case, this includes income generated from loaned players but excludes revenue from the Monks Farm development, which we treated as an exceptional item.
Growth was driven by new partnership agreements, enhanced fan experiences such as The Terrace, and increased income from players loaned out to other clubs.
Key partners for the 2024/25 season included long-standing stadium and front-of-shirt sponsor American Express, Experience Kissimmee as sleeve sponsor, and Nike as the club’s long-term kit supplier.
While Brighton’s commercial revenue has been steadily growing, it likely ranks only around eleventh in the Premier League. Although the “big six” remain on a completely different scale, Brighton still lags significantly behind clubs such as Aston Villa, Newcastle, and West Ham, based on our estimates.
Staff Costs
Staff costs include salaries and wages for all employees, the amortisation of transfer fees (spreading a player’s acquisition cost over the length of their contract), and any impairments, which occur when a player’s estimated market value falls below their book value.
Salaries and wages rose sharply from £146 million to £165 million following the acquisition of several players. While this represents a club record, it still places Brighton around the middle of the Premier League and only about half the level of clubs like Manchester United.
The record spending on players also had a marked effect on amortisation. With over £200 million invested in transfers, amortisation more than doubled, rising from £42 million to £82 million.
Based on our estimates, the chart below compares Brighton’s total staff costs with those of other Premier League clubs. Brighton’s spending remains less than half that of the league’s highest-spending clubs and still lags significantly behind other challengers such as Newcastle and Aston Villa.
Following a total increase of £60 million, Brighton’s staff costs now represent 112% of revenue, up from 83% the previous season. This sharp rise in the cost base will put pressure on the club to either grow revenues—most immediately through European qualification—or generate profits by selling players. Brighton has clearly been highly effective at the latter, but even with strong recruitment processes, consistently achieving this year after year is challenging.
Profit on Player Sales
Brighton’s exceptional recruitment strategy and shrewd player sales have been central to their recent success. Combined profits from player sales from 2021/22 to 2023/24 totaled nearly £300 million, making them the most profitable club over that period—though it is worth noting that few clubs even break even.
Such levels of sales are difficult to sustain. In 2024/25, profits from player sales fell to a still-impressive £57 million, driven by the transfers of Deniz Undav to VfB Stuttgart, Billy Gilmour to Napoli, and Pascal Groß to Borussia Dortmund.
The club is once again expected to record profits from player sales this year, with the departures of Pedro, Adingra, Estupiñán, and Ensico projected to generate around £50–60 million.
Profit and Loss
After several loss-making years during which the club invested heavily in players and facilities, Brighton recorded three highly profitable seasons, driven by a relatively low cost base and league-leading profits from player sales.
In 2024/25, however, following significant investment in the squad—both in wages and transfer fees—the club posted a loss of £56 million.
In 2024/25, overall revenues remained largely flat compared with the previous year, while total costs rose by £65 million. Combined with a drop in player sales profits—from £110 million to £57 million—this resulted in a £131 million swing in profitability, culminating in a reported £56 million loss.
It is worth noting that the published accounts include revenue and costs from the club’s Monks Farm residential development. In 2024/25, this project generated £20.3 million in revenue but incurred £29.7 million in costs. For the purposes of this analysis, the resulting £9.4 million net loss has been treated as an exceptional item.
Net Assets
Net assets represent the difference between total assets and total liabilities and correspond to the club’s net equity.
Assets include fixed assets—such as player registrations, facilities, and goodwill—as well as current assets like trade debtors, transfer fees receivable, and cash.
Liabilities comprise loans (from banks, shareholders, or group companies), transfer fees payable, trade creditors, deferred income (for example, advance season ticket sales), and other financial provisions.
The 2024/25 season saw a marked increase in both total assets and liabilities for Brighton. Investment in the squad lifted player assets by over £120 million, bringing them to £289 million, while a £50 million spend on facilities pushed fixed assets up to £213 million.
Liabilities also rose, with the club taking on an additional £100 million in loans and outstanding transfer fees increasing by £50 million to £152 million.
The net result is that Brighton now have net liabilities of £10 million, giving them one of the lowest asset bases in the division. It is important to note that a club’s net asset position is heavily influenced by how it is funded, particularly for challenger clubs. For example, Aston Villa and Newcastle have both been financed through equity injections, which is why they report positive net assets.
Player Trading
Brighton spent a club-record £210 million on new signings in 2024/25. Major arrivals included Georginio Rutter from Leeds, Matts Wieffer from Feyenoord, Brajan Gruda from Mainz, Ferdi Kadıoğlu from Fenerbahçe, Matt O’Riley from Celtic, Stefanos Tzimas from Stuttgart, Diego Gómez from Inter Miami, and Eiran Cashin from Derby.
The club recouped £64 million, largely through the sales of Deniz Undav, Billy Gilmour, Pascal Groß, and Alex Moder.
The club’s £210 million spending is likely the fourth highest in the division. After accounting for player-sale income, their net transfer spend of £146 million is also likely to rank fourth highest.
Football Net Debt
As shown below, Brighton’s debt has steadily accumulated since Bloom’s takeover, peaking at over £400 million, alongside an additional £95 million raised through equity. Initially, these funds were used to improve facilities, followed by investments in players.
In 2023/24, strong cash flows from player sales allowed the club to reduce its loan by around £74 million, following a £25 million repayment the previous season. However, in 2024/25, much of this money was effectively re-borrowed as investment in new players led to a cash shortfall of approximately £75 million.
Debt across the Premier League reached £3.6 billion in the 2023/24 season, consisting of £2.4 billion owed to third parties and £1.2 billion to related parties. Everton recorded the highest overall debt, although much of its related-party borrowing has since been converted into equity. Brighton’s debt ranks as the fourth highest in the league.
In 2023/24, there was a move toward Bloom converting part of this debt into equity, but this decision was reversed in 2024/25.
Following Brighton’s record spending on players, it is unsurprising that transfer-related debt rose sharply. It is standard practice for clubs to agree payment schedules for transfers that are spread over multiple years.
In 2024/25, transfer fees payable increased by almost £50 million to a club record £152 million, while transfer fees receivable fell to £64 million, down from £113 million the previous season.
As a result, net transfer debt reached £88 million, of which £42 million is due in the current season.
Cash Flow
Cash Flows are reported in three categories:
Cash Flows from Operations refer to cash generated from the club’s core activities—revenue minus day-to-day costs such as salaries, rent, and utilities.
Cash Flows from Investments include cash spent on player acquisitions and facility improvements, net of player or asset sales.
Cash Flows from Financing cover new loans or equity raised, less repayments or buybacks. If operational cash flow cannot fund investments, the shortfall is usually met through financing.
Brighton have generally produced positive operating cash flow, with day-to-day running costs consistently below revenues.
They repeated the feat in 2024/25, generating £15 million in operating cash flow. Sustaining that, however, will be far more challenging as a higher cost base now means operating expenses exceed revenue.
In recent years Brighton have also benefited from a net inflow of investment cash thanks to profitable player trading. That picture reversed in 2024/25, with a net outflow of £99 million — £49 million linked to player trading and £50 million committed to infrastructure projects, one of the largest capital investments in the division. A similar pattern is likely in 2025/26, with a net £88 million currently owed to other clubs.
The season’s shortfall was covered by a £106 million increase in directors’ loans, more than filling the gap and leaving the club with a cash balance of £41 million.
Given another round of significant player sales this season, Brighton are expected to hold sufficient cash reserves to absorb any operating losses.
Reporting Entity
This analysis is based on Brighton and Hove Albion Holdings Limited, the parent company controlled by Tony Bloom, with minority shareholders owning 3.78%. The holding company owns Brighton and Hove Albion Football Club Limited, which operates the men’s team, Brighton and Hove Albion Women’s Football Club, the Community Stadium company that holds the stadium assets, and New Monks Farm Development Limited, a residential property business.
All subsidiaries are consolidated within the group accounts. For the purposes of this review, revenue and costs relating to New Monks Farm have been treated as exceptional items.
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