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Birmingham City Financial Results 2024/25

Updated: 4 hours ago

Record-Breaking Promotion, a Widening Loss, and the Most Expensive Squad League One Has Ever Seen



Summary


  • A record-breaking promotion campaign. Under new manager Chris Davies, Birmingham won the League One title with six games to spare, finishing on a record 111 points and breaking Reading's EFL points record along the way, resulting in an immediate return to the Championship after relegation the previous season.

  • Ownership and management stabilised after a chaotic prior year. American investment firm Knighthead Capital Management (chairman Tom Wagner, with NFL legend Tom Brady as a minority investor) had cycled through several head coaches — permanent or interim — in their first ten months of ownership following the July 2023 takeover. Chris Davies, appointed in June 2024, was the club's manager throughout 2024/25, bringing a much-needed level of stability.

  • Turnover grew sharply, but so did the loss. Turnover rose to £36.5m from £29.6m (+23%), yet the pre-tax loss more than doubled, from £16.1m to £34.4m. Promotion was funded by cost growth that significantly outpaced the revenue gains.

  • The club assembled arguably the most expensively-built squad in League One history. Roughly £25m was spent on 17 new players in summer 2024, headlined by Jay Stansfield's permanent move from Fulham for a League One record fee (reported around £15m, potentially rising to £20m with add-ons) — a fee that alone exceeds the entire third-tier transfer budget of 2023/24.

  • Major infrastructure investment continued alongside the promotion push. Over £15m was spent on stadium and matchday infrastructure in summer 2024 alone, taking total capital spend since Knighthead's 2023 takeover beyond £35m, as part of a wider "sports quarter" vision that includes long-term plans for a much larger stadium.

  • Cash from operations turned positive for the first time in recent seasons — a rare bright spot in an otherwise loss-widening year, reflecting the scale of upfront season-ticket, hospitality and promotion-related cash inflows even as the accounting loss grew.

  • The balance sheet weakened further, with net assets falling to -£79.9m from -£45.5m, as losses were primarily financed through a rise in loans from Knighthead-related entities rather than fresh equity.

  • Profit from player sales played a key role in keeping Birmingham compliant with League One's financial regulations. Player wages are likely to sit at around 71% of "relevant" turnover — a figure that includes the over £15m earned in player sales profits, a sum boosted in part by sell-on clauses attached to Jobe Bellingham's move to Borussia Dortmund.

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Turnover

Turnover rose to £36.5m in 2024/25, up 23% from £29.6m the year before.

Broadcast income: fell sharply to £3.6m from £9.7m, the direct consequence of relegation to League One, where central EFL distributions are much lower than Championship-level payments.


Matchday income: £10.4m, up 70% from £6.1m driven by both more fans and more valuable attendances. Average attendance rose to 26,717 (90.8% capacity) from 21,180, and matchday revenue per paying fan rose to £15.41 from £11.86 (+30%), meaning Birmingham grew both the size of its crowd and the amount each fan generated in the same season.

This reflects the club's rebranded "St Andrew's @ Knighthead Park" matchday experience, including a new fan park reported to have lifted average per-fan spend on matchdays, plus cup-tie premiums from matches such as the visit of Newcastle United in the FA Cup.


Commercial income: £22.5m, up 62% from £13.8m — an exceptional jump for a League One club, driven by Knighthead's US-style commercial strategy. The club's principal partner, sportswear brand UNDEFEATED, extended its front-of-shirt sponsorship for a further three years in September 2024; announcing the deal, CEO Garry Cook said: "For the first time in the Club's history our shirts are being repped on the streets of LA, New York and other leading cities across the US." That international retail and marketing push is reflected directly in the scale of the commercial income increase.


The club also entered into a lucrative stadium naming rights deal with Shelby Companies (part of Knighthead) worth £8.5m, leading to the ground's official rebrand as St Andrew's @ Knighthead Park.


Turnover Ranking: Birmingham's turnover unsurprisingly ranked highest in League One, though only by around £3m over Wrexham — who actually posted higher commercial revenue.



Stadium and infrastructure: Birmingham's owners spent over £15m on infrastructure during summer 2024 alone, taking total capital investment since the July 2023 takeover beyond £35m. This has included the fan park build, general stadium refurbishment, and improvements to training facilities, all branded under the "Knighthead Park" identity — part of a publicly stated longer-term ambition that includes a proposed new stadium of up to 60,000 capacity and a wider "sports quarter" development in the area around St Andrew's.


Staff Costs

Total staff costs: £45.8m, up 14% from £40.2m.



Salaries and wages: £38.9m, up 8.7% from £35.8m. Whilst this is comparatively modest increase, it follows relegation (which typically leads to a drop in wages), is higher than any of their previous seasons in the Championship and a record for League One.


Player amortisation: £6.9m, up 56% from £4.4m — the effect of the Stansfield deal and other significant permanent signings as the cost is spread over their contract lengths.


Wage-to-turnover ratio: improved to 106.7% from 120.9%, and total staff-cost-to-turnover improved to 125.6% from 135.8% — despite costs rising in absolute terms, turnover grew even faster (23% vs 8.7% wage growth), so the ratios moved in the right direction even as the headline loss worsened.


Staff Cost Ranking: total staff costs were more than double the next highest Wrexham, and if Birmingham had been playing in the Championship their costs would have only been exceeded by those with parachute payments and Sunderland, whose costs included a significant promotion bonus. There is no doubt that 111 points was an impressive result, but this should be looked at in the context of the club's significant financial advantage.


Profit from Player Sales: The club generated £14.3m in profit from player sales, drawn from a mix of outright transfers and a sell-on clause. Direct sales included Jordan James's move to Stade Rennais and Koji Miyoshi's transfer to VfL Bochum. Alongside these, the club also benefited from a 15% sell-on clause on Jobe Bellingham, triggered by his transfer from Sunderland to Borussia Dortmund, which brought in roughly £4m.


Profitability

Operating loss: £39.3m, worse than the £29.3m operating loss posted in 2023/24 as costs across the board (amortisation, operating expenses, and matchday/infrastructure spend) grew faster than revenue.


Pre-tax loss: £34.4m, more than double the £16.1m loss the year before.


The club did an excellent job growing revenue after relegation, more than offsetting the drop in central distribution payments. But an aggressive, debt-financed promotion push drove significant increases across every cost line. Over £14m in player sales profits helped offset some of that spend, but it wasn't enough to prevent the club's highest recorded loss in recent history.



Regulatory environment: Birmingham's financial performance in 2024/25 was governed by League One's Salary Cost Management Protocol (SCMP), which caps player-related costs as a percentage of turnover rather than capping the overall loss. The base SCMP threshold for League One that season was 60% of turnover, but clubs freshly relegated from the Championship — as Birmingham had just been — were permitted a higher 75% allowance in their first season back at that level.


Birmingham's player related costs (taking wages at 75% of total salaries and wages plus amortisation) is around £35.6m. Turnover for SCMP calculations includes player sales profits, which in Birmingham's case lifts their SCMP revenue to around £50m, resulting in a SCMP ratio of around 71%.


In addition, "Relevant Turnover" can include guaranteed owner cash or equity injections as "Football Fortune Income," effectively lifting the real spending ceiling for a well-backed ownership group like Knighthead far above what the base percentage implies.


There is no indication Birmingham breached SCMP or faced any embargo or points sanction in 2024/25. The club does have a history with financial regulation, having been the first club ever punished under the Championship's P&S rules, docked nine points in 2019 for losses of £48.8m over three seasons when its wage-to-turnover ratio hit 200%.


Player Trading

Net Trading: the club invested £27m in the squad whilst recovering £14.3m from player sales.


The leading incoming transfer was Jay Stansfield, who joined permanently from Fulham for a League One record fee reported at roughly £15m, with add-ons potentially taking the total to £20m, on a seven-year contract. Stansfield had spent the previous season on loan at Birmingham and was the division's outstanding player, finishing 2024/25 as the club's top scorer with 19 league goals (23 in all competitions). His transfer fee alone was larger than League One clubs' entire player acquisitions in 2023/24.


Birmingham had also broken the League One transfer record twice before signing Stansfield, with Christoph Klarer and Willum Thór Willumsson both arriving for fees in the region of £3.5m each.


Player departures, include Jordan James's move to Stade Rennais and Koji Miyoshi's transfer to VfL Bochum and may also have included late season departures of Romelle Donovan and Ayumu Yokoyama.


Squad book value: rose sharply to £25.4m from £5.1m, directly reflecting the capitalisation of the Stansfield, Klarer and Willumsson fees and the wider £25m summer spend.


Net Assets

Net assets: -£79.9m, worse than -£45.5m the year before — despite the promotion, on-pitch success and revenue growth, the balance sheet position deteriorated further. Total assets increased following their infrastructure and squad investment but this was more than offset by a £55m increase in owner debt and a £16m increase in transfer fees owed to other clubs, after the player acquisition spending spree.


This left net assets more negative than at any point in recent times.


Share capital and share premium were unchanged year-on-year, meaning there were no fresh equity injections from the owners.


Retained earnings (accumulated losses) worsened from -£169.2m to -£203.6m, tracking the widened annual loss.


Football Debt

Total loans: £155.2m, up 56% from £99.1m; Net player trading debt £5.2m, up from negative £3.6m.

Related-party loans (from Knighthead-affiliated entities): £146.1m, up from £91.5m (+59%) as the owners chose to fund the promotion push, transfer record fees and infrastructure spending through loans to the club rather than through non-repayable equity. The bulk of this debt is financed at an interest rate 11.9% as disclosed in their published accounts.


Third party loans remained at a similar level to the previous season at £9m.


Player trading debt (covering transfer market payables/receivables): £5.2m, up from negative £3.6m. Birmingham owed significantly more in transfer fees payable (£21.1m, up from £5.5m) as some of the summer's record fees were structured on deferred payment terms, however this was offset by £15.9m in transfer fees receivable.


Debt-to-turnover ratio: worsened to 4.0x from 2.9x — even with turnover growing strongly, debt grew even faster, so leverage relative to the size of the business increased.


Interest payments: £10.3m, up from £3.1m — as noted above, this is the clearest and most direct cost of financing the club's spending through high interest loans rather than equity, and a cost that will recur in future years' accounts as the loan book.


Cashflow

Cash from operations: +£0.19m, turning positive for the first time in the recent seasons, up from -£20.2m the year before. This is in contrast with the widening headline loss, and is likely explained by the scale of upfront cash inflows for the following Championship season — season-ticket sales, and other commercial income.


Player trading cash flows: £26.1m spent on acquisitions against £8.3m received from sales, a net investing outflow of roughly -£17.8m on player trading — reflecting the summer's heavy net spend on Stansfield and other signings.


Fixed asset investment: £19.9m spent on infrastructure, down slightly from £26.2m the year before but still a very large capital programme by League One standards, consistent with the stadium and fan-park works described above.


Financing activity: £42.3m raised through loans, similar in scale to the £46.1m raised the year before — confirming that a comparable, very large annual injection of owner-backed debt was needed again this season to fund the combined transfer, wage and infrastructure spending. This takes the total raised over the last three season to over £120m.


Net cash movement: +£5.6m, leaving a closing cash balance of £14.2m, up from £8.7m.



 

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