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Chelsea Financial Results 2024/25

Chelsea Financial Results 2024/25

Season 2024/25 was Chelsea’s 119th season and their 36th consecutive campaign in the top flight. After a couple of difficult years, finishing 12th and 6th, Chelsea returned to a degree of success. They finished 4th in the league to secure Champions League qualification, won the UEFA Europa Conference League, and lifted the newly expanded FIFA Club World Cup in the United States at the end of the season. Despite this, there remains a sense of underachievement given the club has spent an extraordinary £1.6 billion on players over the last three years—more than double the next highest spender, Manchester United (£811 million). This unprecedented spending followed the acquisition of the club by BlueCo 22, a consortium led by American businessman Todd Boehly and private equity firm Clearlake Capital. They purchased Chelsea from Roman Abramovich in May 2022 in a deal worth £4.25 billion, comprising a £2.5 billion purchase price and a £1.75 billion commitment to future investment. Todd Boehly and Clearlake's Behdad Eghbali The ownership’s strategy has been to heavily invest in young players on long-term contracts, develop them—often through loan spells (Chelsea had around 20 players out on loan in 2024/25)—and either integrate them into the first team or sell them at a profit. This is clearly a high-risk approach. Chelsea generate the lowest revenue among the “big six”, largely due to stadium constraints, yet their cost base is higher. This has resulted in operating losses (before player sales and exceptional items) that are roughly double those of any other club. Over the three years to 2024/25, these operating losses totalled £758 million. As a result, the club has become reliant on player trading and, more recently, one-off asset sales to reduce losses and remain compliant with financial regulations. While Chelsea have generated substantial profits from player sales—the highest in the league over the past three seasons—this alone has not been sufficient. The club therefore turned to intra-group asset sales: in 2022/23, two hotels were sold for £70 million, and in 2023/24, the women’s team was sold for £200 million. Both transactions were conducted between Chelsea FC and other entities within the BlueCo 22 group and were approved by the Premier League for Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) purposes. Across the two seasons to 2023/24, these asset sales transformed what would have been a £237 million loss into a £38 million profit. However, in 2024/25, with lower profits from player sales and no asset disposals, Chelsea reported a £262 million loss—the largest ever recorded by an English football club. This demonstrates the structural challenges of the club’s financial model. Looking ahead, reducing these losses will be challenging. Generating profits from player sales is becoming more difficult, as long-term contracts keep players’ book values high, reducing potential gains on disposal. Indeed, based on Transfermarkt estimates, the squad’s market value is now roughly in line with its net book value, limiting scope for future profits. In addition, the club is unlikely to have significant assets left to sell. Thanks to asset sales over the previous two years, we assume Chelsea have complied with the Premier League’s Profit and Sustainability Rules. Premier League Sanctions In March 2026, Chelsea were sanctioned by the Premier League with a record £10.75 million fine and a suspended one-year transfer ban due to historical financial breaches. These related to over £47 million in undisclosed payments made to third parties and agents between 2011 and 2018 during Roman Abramovich's ownership. Group Financial Overview To better understand the scale of Chelsea’s financial model, it is useful to look at their parent company, BlueCo 22 Limited, which also owns Chelsea Women and French Ligue 1 side RC Strasbourg. In 2024/25, the group reported a loss of £619 million, following a £402 million loss the previous year—more than £1 billion in losses over just two seasons. These figures reflect the consolidated performance of all three clubs, excluding intra-group transactions, and include the amortisation and impairment of goodwill arising from the original acquisitions. Looking further up the structure to the parent entity, 22 Holdco, provides additional insight into how this strategy is financed. This company carries bank debt of around £1.4 billion, of which approximately £600 million is in the form of payment-in-kind (PIK) loans, where interest is rolled up and added to the principal rather than paid in cash. These borrowings come at relatively high interest rates, with the group reporting £136 million in annual interest costs. This financing structure significantly increases financial risk, indicating that the ownership model is highly leveraged and sensitive to both performance and funding conditions. Matchday Finance's unique platform puts the power of analysis in your hands. Whether you're a fan, journalist, industry expert, or investor, all the key numbers are right at your fingertips. Chelsea Financial Results 2024/25 The Europa Conference League win and a portion of the FIFA Club World Cup prize money boosted revenue by £23 million to £491 million. However, Chelsea’s structurally high cost base led to operating losses of £308 million, which were only partially offset by £57 million in player trading profits, resulting in a £262 million loss—the largest ever recorded in English football. Financial highlights: Revenue: Total revenue reached £491 million, up £23 million year-on-year, driven by their Europa Conference League run and a portion of FIFA Club World Cup prize money. Staff costs: Wages increased by £21 million to £359 million. Total staff costs were £585 million, the highest in the league and equivalent to 119% of revenue—one of the highest ratios in the division. Player sales: The club generated £58 million from player sales, mainly from the departures of Conor Gallagher and Bashir Humphreys. Profit/loss: Chelsea reported a loss of £262 million, the largest ever recorded in English football. Net assets: Net assets fell by £77 million to £872 million, still the highest in the division. Player trading: The club spent £305 million on new signings, bringing total spending to £1.6 billion over the last three years. This was partially offset by £126 million in player sales. Loans and debt: Chelsea have no external debt at the club level, as this is held by the ultimate parent company, 22 Holdco. Net outstanding transfer fees fell to £208 million, although this remains among the highest in the league. Cash Flow: The club recorded operating cash outflows of £355 million and net investment inflows of £38 million. The resulting funding gap was covered by a £339 million share issue from the parent company. Financial Outlook Chelsea are set for a significant revenue boost this year. Their Champions League round of 16 run is expected to generate around £75 million, compared to just £19 million from the Conference League last season. In addition, they are likely to recognise around £60 million from winning the FIFA Club World Cup (with approximately £20 million booked last year). The addition of a front-of-shirt sponsor, along with higher matchday and commercial income from Champions League participation, will provide further uplift. Overall, we estimate Chelsea’s revenue for the season at £630–650 million, a substantial increase on the £491 million reported in 2024/25. However, if costs remain broadly unchanged and profit on player sales stays at around £31 million (based on the summer window), the club would still be expected to post a loss of roughly £120 million. In the final year of the Premier League’s Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR), this would result in cumulative unadjusted losses of £259 million over three years. Assuming allowable adjustments of around £40 million per year (for youth development, infrastructure investment and the women’s team prior to its sale), adjusted losses would come to approximately £139 million—above the £104 million PSR threshold. This suggests there may be a need for further player sales before year-end to remain compliant. Looking further ahead, questions remain over the sustainability of Chelsea’s model. The introduction of the squad cost ratio as the Premier League’s primary financial control may work in their favour, as it focuses on squad costs relative to revenue, rather than profitability. However, underlying losses are likely to persist. With a new stadium still some way off, revenue growth will depend heavily on on-pitch performance, while the club’s ability to consistently generate large profits from player trading may be limited. Also, any season without Champions League football would widen losses further. At the time of this report, Chelsea sit sixth, four points outside the Champions League places and 22 points behind leaders Arsenal. That sense of underachievement, given the scale of investment, is weighing heavily. Turnover Revenue is generated from three primary streams: matchday income (ticket sales), broadcasting distributions (from the Premier League and, where applicable, UEFA competitions), and commercial activities, including sponsorships, merchandising, and other business operations. Chelsea’s turnover increased by £25 million to £491 million, driven by their Europa Conference League win and a portion of the FIFA Club World Cup prize money. This was partially offset by lower commercial revenue, as the club did not have a front-of-shirt sponsor for the majority of the season. Chelsea's revenue ranks sixth in the league, the lowest of the Big six. While the traditional Big Six still lead the way, clubs such as Aston Villa and Newcastle have begun to close the gap to the established elite. Matchday Revenue Matchday revenue is driven by several factors, including the number of home fixtures, average attendance, ticket pricing, hospitality and premium seating. Domestic cup competitions are an exception, as gate receipts are shared between the participating clubs and the FA. Chelsea’s home ground is Stamford Bridge, which has been their stadium since the club was formed in 1905. With a capacity of 40,341, it is the smallest among the traditional “big” Premier League clubs and ranks as the 11th largest stadium in the division. Its location in West London means any expansion is constrained by surrounding residential and commercial buildings. The current ownership has stated that redevelopment remains a priority and has explored two main options: redeveloping Stamford Bridge, which would be complex and expensive and likely require temporary relocation, or moving to a new site, which presents significant political and logistical challenges. From a financial perspective, the stadium is one of Chelsea’s key constraints. Its relatively small capacity and ageing facilities limit both matchday and commercial revenue. For example, matchday income is estimated to be around £50 million lower than Tottenham’s. The club has approximately 28,000 season ticket holders, and with over 100,000 members, demand for tickets far exceeds supply. . During 2024/25, the club averaged 39,621 fans per Premier League match. Due to their Europa Conference League run, they also hosted six additional home fixtures in Europe, although early exits in both domestic cup competitions meant they played nine fewer domestic cup ties, where revenue is shared. Overall, total paying attendance still rose by 11% to 1.04 million. Chelsea had frozen season ticket prices for 11 years up to 2023/24 before implementing a 5% increase in 2024/25. Even with the long period of price stability, the club continues to generate one of the highest revenue-per-fan figures in the league, supported by its profile and London location. This “yield” declined slightly in 2024/25 from £85.60 to £83.50 per attendee, potentially reflecting lower pricing for earlier-stage Europa Conference League fixtures. Overall, the additional Europa Conference League matches boosted total matchday income from £80.1 million to a club-record £86.8 million. Chelsea's matchday revenue ranks fifth in the league. This seasons five high-value home Champions League fixtures and their extended domestic cup runs will further increase matchday revenue this year. Broadcast Revenue Broadcast revenue is generated primarily through central Premier League distributions, UEFA payments from European competitions and the club’s own media activities. The 2024/25 season marked the third and final year of the Premier League’s current broadcast cycle, with total distributions broadly consistent with 2023/24 levels. Approximately 67% of broadcast income is shared equally among clubs, with the remainder allocated through merit payments based on league position and facility fees linked to the number of live televised matches. Chelsea's 4th-place finish earned £164 million in Premier League broadcast income. The chart below shows club-by-club distributions published by the Premier League, with each league position worth close to £3 million in merit payments. Chelsea have participated in European competition in seven of the last eight seasons (including the current campaign). In 2024/25, they competed in the Europa Conference League, which they won. This victory earned them £19 million in UEFA distributions. This season, they reached the round of 16 in the Champions League, where they lost to PSG, which is expected to generate around £75 million in revenue. In Europe the new league formats for UEFA’s three club competitions increased overall distributions by approximately 20%, with around 75% allocated to Champions League participants, 15% to Europa League clubs, and 10% to Europa Conference League teams. The earnings of the seven English clubs participating in the competitions is shown below, which demonstrates the value of participating in the Champions League. At the end of the season, Chelsea—along with Manchester City—participated in the newly expanded FIFA Club World Cup, which Chelsea went on to win. This is expected to generate around £85 million in total prize money. However, as the tournament straddled the club’s financial year-end, only around £22 million of this was recognised in 2024/25. The chart below shows combined broadcast revenue for 2024/25, including Premier League distributions, UEFA payments, and FIFA Club World Cup income. Overall, Chelsea rank fifth with £203 million. Commercial Revenue Chelsea’s commercial revenue was impacted by the absence of a front-of-shirt sponsor for much of the season. The club had reportedly been holding out for a deal worth around £60 million per year, but this did not materialise until May 2025, when they finally secured a partnership with Dubai-based property developer DAMAC Properties. Other key commercial partners in 2024/25 included entertainment technology platform Fever, reportedly worth around £8 million per year, and long-term kit supplier Nike, whose deal is valued at approximately £60 million annually. Nike’s agreement runs from 2017 through to 2032. As a result of the missing front-of-shirt sponsor, Chelsea’s commercial revenue fell from £225 million to £201 million in 2024/25. As the chart below illustrates, the “Big Six” continue to operate at a significantly higher level in terms of commercial revenue. While Newcastle and Aston Villa have narrowed the gap on Chelsea in recent years, the return of a front-of-shirt sponsor should see that gap widen again this season. ► Return to summary Staff Costs Staff costs comprise salaries and wages for all employees, the amortisation of transfer fees (the allocation of a player’s acquisition cost over the length of their contract), and impairment charges. Impairments arise when a player’s estimated recoverable value falls below their carrying value on the balance sheet. Chelsea’s strategy of high-volume player recruitment has significantly increased squad size and, in turn, the wage bill. A key element of this approach is loaning out players—around 20 were out on loan in 2024/25—which helps offset some of these costs. However, UEFA regulations limit clubs to a maximum of six senior international loans, which constrains the effectiveness of this model. After peaking at £404 million in 2022/23, the wage bill has fallen to £359 million, now below that of champions Liverpool and Manchester City. It is likely this included bonus for wining the Europa Conference League but not the FIFA Club World Cup as that concluded after the end of Chelsea's financial year. The club’s aggressive recruitment strategy has a much greater impact on amortisation. While Chelsea frequently issue long-term contracts—often up to eight years—spreading transfer costs over a longer period, they still report the highest amortisation charge in the league by a significant margin. This rose to £214 million in 2024/25, up £22 million year-on-year. Had the club used more traditional five-year contracts, this figure would be substantially higher. In addition, Chelsea recorded £12 million in impairment charges, reflecting cases where a player’s book value exceeds their recoverable value. With such a large squad, it is difficult to identify the specific players involved, but high-profile signings such as Raheem Sterling and Mykhailo Mudryk are likely contributors at various points. Including the addition of their impairment charge, Chelsea reported the highest staff costs in the division in 2024/25. Chelsea's total staff costs of £585 million represent 119% of revenue, the fifth highest in the league and by far the highest amongst the big six, with next highest Manchester City's at 83%. Profit on Player Sales One downside of offering players long-term contracts is that it reduces the profit realised on future sales, as their book value remains relatively high. This creates a potential constraint within Chelsea’s model, which is heavily reliant on generating player trading profits to help offset operating losses. However, this is partly mitigated when the club sells academy graduates. In such cases, the player’s book value is effectively zero, meaning the full transfer fee (less any direct costs) is recognised as profit. In 2024/25, Chelsea sold academy graduates Conor Gallagher (Atlético Madrid) and Bashir Humphreys (Burnley), who together accounted for the majority of the £59 million in player trading profits. In addition, they also sold Angelo (Al-Nassr) and Kepa Arrizabalaga (Arsenal). Among the clubs that have published full financial results to date, Chelsea's profit from player sales ranks 6th highest. The club also reported that it had disposed of 15 players in the early part of the 2025/26 season, generating a combined profit of £31.8 million. This included several notable names such as Noni Madueke, Nkunku, Petrovic, and João Félix. The majority of the profit is likely to have come from Madueke and Petrovic, as others were sold for significantly less than their original acquisition cost. Squad Cost Ratio The Premier League will implement a new set of financial rules from the 2026/27 season, replacing the existing Profitability and Sustainability Rules (PSR). A central metric under the new framework is the Squad Cost Ratio, which caps clubs’ on-pitch spending at 85% of football-related revenue, including net profit or loss from player sales (based on the average over the last three seasons). This metric is broadly aligned with UEFA’s Squad Cost Ratio, which is set at a stricter 70%. As a result, clubs not competing in European competitions can invest at relatively higher levels than those, like Liverpool, already active in Europe. Based on our estimates, Chelsea’s squad cost ratio (SCR) is around 83%, assuming that “football-only” wages account for approximately 75% of total salaries and wages. This places the club just below the Premier League’s projected future limits. It is notable that a club reporting a record £256 million loss can still comply with the Premier League’s financial controls. However, Chelsea’s SCR remains above UEFA’s cap, which is likely to result in further penalties. This is not a new situation for the club. In a statement released in July 2025: “Chelsea FC has entered into a settlement agreement with UEFA concerning a break-even deficit reported by the Club under UEFA’s Financial Sustainability Regulations covering the financial years 2022/23 and 2023/24. The Club has also agreed to pay a fine as a result of the Club’s squad cost ratio in the 2024 reporting year being between 80% and 90%.” Managing sanctions and financial penalties therefore appears to have become a recurring feature of the club’s operating environment. ► Return to summary Profit and Loss It is clear that Chelsea are operating a business model not previously seen in the Premier League. Day-to-day operating costs run at close to 100% of revenue, largely driven by high staff costs. In addition, amortisation is the highest in the league, reflecting over £1.5 billion spent on player acquisitions, resulting in operating losses consistently exceeding £200 million. While these losses have been partially offset by strong profits from player sales, the club has still relied on one-off asset disposals to entities within the BlueCo 22 group to remain compliant with Premier League financial regulations. These included the sale of two hotels for £70 million in 2022/23 and the women’s team for £199 million in 2023/24. The use of intra-group asset sales attracted significant scrutiny across the football world, but the transactions were approved by the Premier League, meaning the club remained within the rules. In fact, Chelsea were not alone in adopting this approach. In 2024/25, several other clubs used similar mechanisms: Newcastle United sold leasehold improvements relating to their stadium for £123 million, while both Everton and Aston Villa sold their women’s teams. In each case, the assets were sold to other entities within their respective ownership groups. Breaking down Chelsea’s 2024/25 profit and loss account, total revenue reached £491 million, an increase of £23 million year-on-year. Wage costs rose by £21 million, while other operating expenses increased by £62 million, including £27 million in settlements relating to UEFA Financial Sustainability Regulations and £24 million in other legal matters. As a result, EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation) fell by £61 million to £69 million. After accounting for £214 million in player amortisation (up £22 million), £12 million in player impairments, and £13 million in depreciation, the club recorded an operating loss of £308 million. While very few Premier League clubs report an operating profit, Chelsea’s operating loss is the highest ever recorded in the division. The operating deficit was partly offset by £58 million in profit from player sales. However, interest costs of £9 million and exceptional costs of £3 million resulted in a record pre-tax loss of £262 million, a £391 million drop compared to the previous year’s £128 million profit, which had included a £199 million gain on the sale of the women’s team. Across the division, six clubs reported a profit, with total losses across the league amounting to £796 million. Three clubs generated profits from one-off asset sales in 2024/25. Newcastle recorded £133 million, primarily from the sale of their stadium leasehold improvements. Aston Villa sold their women’s team to a group entity, with the final figure yet to be disclosed but potentially as high as £100 million. Everton also recorded a £49 million gain from the sale of their women’s team and Goodison Park Limited to a group entity. If these asset sales are excluded, total losses across the league would exceed £1 billion for the year, the highest on record. These losses must be financed, and an additional £1.3 billion of new funding was raised by clubs, primarily to cover operating shortfalls as well as ongoing investment in assets. ► Return to summary Net Assets Net assets represent the difference between total assets and total liabilities and correspond to the club’s net equity. ​ Assets include fixed assets—such as player registrations, facilities, and goodwill—as well as current assets like trade debtors, transfer fees receivable, and cash. Liabilities comprise loans (from banks, shareholders, or group companies), transfer fees payable, trade creditors, deferred income (for example, advance season ticket sales), and other financial provisions. ​ Under the Abramovich era, the club was financed through £1.1 billion of loans, which resulted in a significant net liability position. These loans were written off as part of the acquisition, and since then the Chelsea football entity has been funded through equity injections from the parent company. The debt now sits at the parent level, so it does not appear on Chelsea’s balance sheet. At the end of 2024/25, the club reported total assets of £1.5 billion. This included £1.0 billion in player book value, £144 million in fixed assets, and £183 million in transfer fees receivable, with the remainder held in cash and other assets. These assets are offset by total liabilities of £668 million, comprising £391 million in transfer fees payable and £277 million in other liabilities, resulting in net assets of £872 million. The table below shows the latest available net asset positions of Premier League clubs, with Chelsea’s £872 million the highest in the division. It is worth noting, however, that the club has received over £1 billion in equity funding from its parent company, while the ultimate parent holds more than £1 billion of debt. There are several balance sheet–related measures within the Premier League’s new financial regulations, which come into effect next year. These fall under the Sustainability and Systemic Resilience (SSR) framework and include: Working Capital Test This assesses a club’s immediately available cash headroom over the course of a season. Clubs must maintain at least £12.5 million in short-term liquid assets. Liquidity Test This examines medium-term resilience and a club’s ability to withstand financial shocks, such as relegation. A club must demonstrate that its liquid assets, less liquid liabilities, plus 40% of squad market value, exceed £85 million. In practical terms, this reflects whether a club could cover short-term obligations by selling part of its squad if required. Positive Equity Test This measures long-term financial health. It includes the full squad market value (or net book value, if higher) as an adjusted asset. Total liabilities must not exceed 90% of adjusted assets, tightening to 80% by 2028/29. Chelseas are well positioned under these tests as they have no debt. For example, their estimated positive equity test ratio stands at around 43%. ► Return to summary Player Trading Player trading sits at the heart of Chelsea’s strategy. Since the takeover, the club has spent around £1.6 billion on transfers—roughly double the next highest spender, Manchester United—while generating £516 million from player sales. That equates to a net spend of approximately £1.08 billion. The model is built on assembling a large squad of young, high-potential players on long-term contracts, developing them (often through loan spells), and then either integrating them into the first team or selling them at a profit. The effectiveness of this approach ultimately hinges on successful player development and sustained market demand—neither of which can be guaranteed. As outlined earlier, this strategy brings significant cost and increases the risk of breaching both Premier League and UEFA profit and sustainability rules. It remains a relatively untested model at this scale, and its long-term viability is still uncertain. Spending eased slightly in 2024/25, with £305 million invested in transfers—the third-highest total in the league. Notable arrivals included Pedro Neto (Wolves), João Félix (Atlético Madrid), Liam Delap (Ipswich), Kiernan Dewsbury-Hall (Leicester), Filip Jørgensen (Villarreal), Dário Essugo (Sporting CP), Mike Penders (Genk), Aarón Anselmino (Boca Juniors), Mathis Amougou (Saint-Étienne), Mamadou Sarr (Strasbourg), Renato Veiga (Basel) and Caleb Wiley (Atlanta United). This outlay was partly offset by £126 million in player sales, driven largely by academy graduates such as Conor Gallagher (Atlético Madrid) and Bashir Humphreys (Burnley), alongside departures including Angelo (Al-Nassr) and Kepa Arrizabalaga (Arsenal). Looking at the past three seasons, Chelsea’s spending on player acquisitions is nearly £800 million higher than the next highest club, Manchester United. Their net transfer spend (purchases less sales) totals £1.086 billion—£442 million more than United over the same period. The club has spent a further £263 million this year, with arrivals including Pedro, Gittens, Garnacho, Estevão and Paez. This has been largely offset by significant sales of around £250 million, including Madueke, Nkunku, Petrovic, Ugochukwu and João Félix. Squad Cost and Net Book Value Squad costs represent the total acquisition cost of all squad members, including transfer fees and associated costs such as agent fees. A squad’s Net Book Value (NBV) represents this acquisition cost less accumulated amortisation, with transfer fees expensed over the length of each player’s contract. For example, a player purchased for £50 million on a five-year contract would have an NBV that decreases by £10 million each year. After the club’s unprecedented spending, they have assembled the most expensive squad in Premier League history. The total squad cost has risen to £1.5 billion, with a net book value of £1.04 billion. Chelsea's net book value of £1,044 million is the highest in the league. Squad Market Value The squad's net book value (NBV) is part of the club balance sheet, recorded as Intangible Player Assets. The NBV does not however reflect a squad’s current market value. According to transfermark.com, Chelsea's squad had an estimated market value of around £1.084 billion at the end of the 2024/25 season—the second highest in the league behind Manchester City. Chelsea appears to be in a unique position, where their market value sits close to their book value, with limited uplift. This likely reflects a combination of long-term contracts and, in some cases, high acquisition costs. While transfermarket.com valuations do not necessarily reflect achievable transfer fees, they remain a useful benchmark. In Chelsea’s case, they suggest there may be limited scope to generate large profits from future player sales. This is reflected in the latest accounts, which note that post year-end player sales of around £250 million generated only £31 million in profit. At the end of the season, Chelsea’s most valuable players on Transfermarkt were Cole Palmer (£100 million), Moisés Caicedo (£76 million), Enzo Fernández (£64 million) and Levi Colwill (£45 million). ► Return to summary Football Net Debt As mentioned, the entity Chelsea FC Holdings Limited carries no debts at the end of 2024/25, as funding has been provided by the owner through equity. However, the ultimate parent company, 22 Holdco Limited carries bank debt of around £1.4 billion, of which approximately £600 million is in the form of payment-in-kind (PIK) loans, where interest is rolled up and added to the principal rather than paid in cash. Premier League clubs’ total debt, net of cash, is £3.6 billion, down from £4.2 billion in the previous year. A significant factor in this reduction was a £450 million shareholder loan to Everton being converted into equity prior to the club’s sale. Tottenham recorded the highest debt, driven largely by stadium financing, followed by Manchester United, reflecting their highly leveraged Glazer-era ownership structure. While the club has no traditional debt, it carries significant transfer liabilities arising from its player acquisition strategy. At the end of 2024/25, transfer fees payable to other clubs totalled £391 million, partially offset by £183 million in fees receivable. This leaves a net transfer debt of £208 million—the fourth highest in the division, behind Tottenham and the two Manchester clubs. Of this net balance, £72 million is due for payment within the current season. ► Return to summary Cash Flow Cash Flows are reported in three categories: ​ Cash Flows from Operations refer to cash generated from the club’s core activities—revenue minus day-to-day costs such as salaries, rent, and utilities. Cash Flows from Investments include cash spent on player acquisitions and facility improvements, net of player or asset sales. Cash Flows from Financing cover new loans or equity raised, less repayments or buybacks. If operational cash flow cannot fund investments, the shortfall is usually met through financing. Looking at Chelsea’s cash flow over the last three years lays bare the scale of their player acquisition strategy. Over this period, the club recorded operating cash outflows of £191 million, making them the only “Big Six” club to post negative operating cash flow. In addition, they spent £1.49 billion on player acquisitions and £41 million on facilities, partially offset by £594 million received from player sales. This results in a funding gap of £1.09 billion, which has been financed through a combination of share issues and loans from the parent company. ► Return to summary Reporting Entity This analysis is based on the entity Chelsea FC Holdings Limited for the period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025. The company is owned 100% by Blueco 22 Midco Limited, which also owns Chelsea Football Club Women Ltd and Blueco Alsace (the owner of Racing Club Strasbourg). Blueco 22 Midco is in turn owned 100% by Blueco Limited, which is owned by the ultimate parent company, 22 Holdco Limited. 22 Holdco Limited is owned 61.54% by Blues Investment L.P. (controlled by Clearlake Capital) and 38.46% by Blueco 22 Holdings L.P. (controlled by the Todd Boehly group). ► Return to summary

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